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How ordinary people view Muslim group rights in Britain, the
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majorities and Muslims?
Paul Statham
Sussex Centre for Migration Research, School of Global Studies, University of Sussex, Brighton BN1 9RH, UK
ABSTRACT
Taking four countries—Britain, the Netherlands, France and Germany—
with distinct state approaches and public debates over accommodating
Muslims, we study the views of ordinary people from the majority and
Muslim populations on Muslim group rights. We compare their responses
to questions on mosque-building, teachers wearing religious symbols,
and religious classes in schools, to determine whether there is a
significant ‘gap’ between the majority and Muslim minorities. We find
highly significant ‘gaps’ between the majorities and Muslims over Muslim
group rights in all countries, with the majorities less supportive.
Importantly, it is a shift by the majority population against Muslim group
rights that produces this ‘gap’ as the question moves from provision for
Christians to Muslims, while Muslims hold similar views over rights for
Christians and their own religion. In Britain and Germany, the two
countries where church/state relations privilege Christianity over other
religions, majorities especially support Christian over Muslim group rights.
The British findings are remarkable, because a country which substantially
grants and has the most supportive public debate for Muslim group
rights, produces the largest ‘gaps’ between its majority and Muslims. We
think this is due to political context, where in contrast to the Netherlands,
there is no outlet for political opposition to Muslim group rights.
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Across Europe, and in contrast to North America, states’ attempts to accommodate Muslims are the
definitive feature of ‘multicultural’ controversies (Joppke and Torpey 2013; Koopmans 2013). This
has a factual basis.1 It also places the state’s efforts to accommodate Islam as a minority religion
at centre stage. Much research has focused on cross-national variations in the legal and institutional
incorporation of Islam (Fetzer and Soper 2005; Joppke 2009), and whether religion is a ‘bridge’ or a
‘barrier’ to integration, to use Foner and Alba’s (2008) formulation. Some argue that Islam is a
‘barrier’ and source of conflict because European societal institutions and national identities remain
anchored to an important extent in Christianity and do not make equal room for Islam (e.g. Zolberg
andWoon 1999, 7; Foner and Alba 2008, 374). Charles Taylor makes a similar claim about the Chris-
tian foundations of liberalism (1994, 62): ‘as many Muslims are well aware, western liberalism is not
so much an expression of the secular, postreligious outlook that happens to be popular among liberal
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intellectuals as a more organic outgrowth of Christianity’. Against this, other authors (see especially
Joppke 2009) have documented how European liberal nation-states notwithstanding their different
institutional traditions for accommodating religions and their distinct national identities, have
importantly extended Muslim group rights, largely because their legal and constitutional institutions
uphold liberal norms, often in the face of public opposition. For Joppke and Torpey (2013, 141–142),
public sentiments should not be confused with public institutions, which due to the prevalence of
liberal norms cannot operate unchallenged on an ethnocentric basis, so that: ‘religion, particularly
Islam, may still be more “barrier” than “bridge” to including immigrants in Europe but only as a
matter of mentalities, not of institutions’.
So far, there has been virtually no research on how the institutional accommodation of Islam,
mediated through political controversies, relates to the views of ordinary people living in that
country. While different degrees of institutional accommodation have taken place, and public con-
troversies have occurred in all countries, though to different degrees and focusing on different issues,
how does this relate to what people from the majority and Muslim minority populations think about
extending Muslim group rights?
This article is one of the first to address the important question of what ordinary people think
about the extension of group rights to Muslims by recourse to original empirical evidence on
their opinions and on political contestation that they see in public debates. Group rights exhibit
two features: first, if granted the group right goes beyond the set of common civil and political rights
of individual citizenship that are protected in all liberal democracies; second, if realised, the group
right constitutes the recognition and accommodation by the state of the distinctive identity and
need of the minority group (Statham et al. 2005). Examples include policies that allow exemptions
from existing rules and obligations, state support for separate institutions, special facilities in main-
stream public institutions, such as schools and media, representation rights for ethnic and religious
organisations, and affirmative action programmes. The study is cross-national comparative, includ-
ing the Netherlands, Britain, France and Germany. These four countries have the most sizeable Mus-
lim populations of immigrant origin inWestern Europe (Buijs and Rath 2002) and importantly, have
implemented distinct state approaches for extending rights to Muslims based on their specific
church–state relations (Koenig 2007).
We examine how ordinary people respond to questions on issues about mosque-building, teachers
wearing religious symbols, and religious classes in schools. Our primary aim is to examine whether
there are significant ‘gaps’ in opinions between the majority populations and Muslims themselves.
This matters because it indicates whether there is consensus or a potential for conflict along Mus-
lim/non-Muslim lines among ordinary peoples’ perceptions. As van der Noll and Saroglou state
(2015, 221): ‘Studying public opinion… gives an indication of exclusion and oppression in everyday
encounters, as well as whether there is a basis for current and future legislation concerning the accom-
modation of Islam.’ It allows us to see whether a strong line of demarcation is constructed by the ways
that majorities and Muslims think about these issues that might impact upon the social relationships
between them. Of course, mutual tolerance works from both sides. So it matters where the opinions of
Muslims andmajorities stand relative to one another over the issues, and in relation to the degree and
form of institutional accommodation of Muslim group rights in their respective country.
Given the important cross-national variations in the degrees and ways the state has accommo-
dated Muslim group rights in the four countries, we examine the majority/Muslim ‘gaps’ within
countries and interpret our findings in relation to their specific national contexts. An important
part of this context is provided by the national public debates over Muslim group rights. First, public
debates carried by the mass media are the location for controversies over Muslim group rights that
result when political actors challenge a state’s policy. Second, the conceptual and cognitive frame-
works that ordinary people have for interpreting group rights will be shaped, but not determined,
by public debates, because this is the agenda-setting supply-line of political information that is pub-
licly visible and accessible in a society.2 We undertake an analysis of national public debates in order
to have a contextual indicator for the degree and form of contestation over Muslim group rights that
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is visible to people in their respective country and that may potentially shape their opinions. In this
way, we interpret our findings on the ‘gaps’ between majorities and Muslims, by relating them back
to a state’s policies for granting Muslim rights, and the visible public controversies between political
actors over them.
In the next section, we outline the basic differences in their respective church–state relations that
have provided the institutional frameworks for accommodating Islam. After this we undertake a
claim-making analysis of public debates over group rights for Muslims, in order to determine the
degrees and forms of contestation in the countries. This matters because it indicates how politics
in the public domain mediates the issues of Muslim group rights, so that they are visible to ordinary
people. Especially important is the degree of public support or opposition for Muslim group rights
from actors representing the state, political parties and majority civil society. Then we turn to the
primary focus, which is an analysis of responses by members of the public to survey questions on
the presence of minarets, whether teachers should be allowed to wear (Christian or Islamic) religious
symbols in schools, and whether religious classes should be allowed in schools for Christians or Mus-
lims. Here we examine the ‘gap’ in opinions between the majority and Muslims within each country.
We take this as an indicator for the socio-cultural distance between the groups over the extension of
Muslim group rights. In addition, our Muslim sample is composed of four groups with origins in
different countries (former-Yugoslavia; Pakistan; Morocco; Turkey) to see if there is variation
among Muslim minorities. The cross-national comparative research design allows us to interpret
the findings on public opinion in relation to their distinct national institutional approaches for
accommodating religious rights for Muslims, and their respective public debates for legitimating
them. Finally, the concluding discussion accounts for the ‘gaps’.
State accommodation of Muslim group rights
Religion is centrally important to understanding European countries’ controversies over their
attempts to ‘integrate’ Muslims (Bader 2007; Foner and Alba 2008; Joppke 2009; Laurence 2012;
Brubaker 2015). First, although European societies consider themselves broadly secular, Christian
religions play influential institutional social and political roles, that matter irrespective of the actual
number of practicing worshippers. These institutional arrangements of church/state relations define
pre-existing conditions and the political environment into which immigrant religions have to nego-
tiate a space for their community. Second, religious identification is a belief system that can shape an
individual’s core identity, opinions and political behaviour. A religious migrant may consider practi-
cing religion as a sacred duty that cannot be compromised. While states consciously try to shape civic
identifications through integration policies, they do not to the same degree for migrants’ religious
identifications, not least because the liberal state upholds individual freedom of religious practice.
Third, the nature of the immigrant religion is likely to influence the degree to which migrants
adapt or resist when faced by the dominant culture. In this respect, the public duties of worship
that are associated with Islam can be more obtrusive and visible, and less easy to accommodate
within the public life of a western society, than those of immigrant religions where worship takes
place mostly in private.
The sizeable literature on cross-national variations emphasises how historical resolutions of
church–state conflicts have shaped the accommodation of Islam as a minority religion in Europe
(Fetzer and Soper 2005; Statham et al 2005; Koenig 2007; Soper and Fetzer 2007; Laurence 2012).
There is considerable agreement on the prominent features that define the church/state separations
in our four countries. France, the Netherlands, Britain and Germany represent four distinct insti-
tutional types of religious accommodation, here understood as ‘opportunity structures’ (Koopmans
and Statham 2000), that importantly influence the degree and form to which Islam has been incor-
porated through an extension of rights to Muslims. Here we briefly present the basic cross-national
variations in the countries’ institutional traditions for church/state relations, to provide context for
informing the subsequent analyses.
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France, under the concept of laïcité, is the archetypal secularist case, where there is a strict state–
church separation that provides little space for religion in public life and institutions. The French
state and public institutions are committed to secularism and even the role of Christian churches
is restricted in the public sphere. As a consequence of laïcité, the French state has been resistant
to the idea of separate institutions, such as schools, for religious groups, and displays of religiosity
in public environments. In France there is a broad consensus that civil servants should not display
visible markers of religion. In a context where even Catholic institutions, such as schools, receive far
less state support and recognition than elsewhere, Islam has faced difficulties in finding an insti-
tutional foothold within a restrictive state framework (Laurence 2012).
The Dutch case stands in stark contrast to French laïcité. In the Netherlands church/state
relations evolved around the logic of ‘pillarisation’ as a consequence of ideological struggles between
Catholic, Protestant and secular groups in the late nineteenth century. ‘Pillarisation’ consists in a
denominational segregation of society where religious or ideological groups have the right to estab-
lish their own social infrastructure with state support. Hence Dutch church/state relations follow a
tradition for:
noninterference of the state in religious self-governance, which was broadly defined to include religious schools,
hospitals, cultural and welfare institutions, and a range of other sectors. The compromise also entailed full state
funding—on an equal basis for all denominations—for these sectors. (Koopmans 2013, 155)
Although actual ‘pillarisation’ died out in the 1960s, its imprint is still influential as a logic embedded
in institutional arrangements and law, and serves as a reference point for how to accommodate Mus-
lim rights (Carol and Koopmans 2013, 171). In this context, Muslims and other ‘newcomer’ religious
minorities have found it relatively easy to claim group rights granted to other religious denomina-
tions, while the state has traditionally refrained from preventing the expression of minority religions
in public institutions.
Britain has an official state Christian church that is privileged over others. The Church of England
is led by the Queen, as Head of State, while more than 20 Anglican Bishops sit in the second chamber
the House of Lords. In Britain, the rights and privileges that the state grants the Church of England
are not automatically extended to other religious groups. Nonetheless, a pragmatic form of accom-
modation has proceeded, with the state relatively willing to grant rights to newer religions, a process
that is supported in a paternalistic way by the Church of England: ‘importantly, the presence of an
established church and its close links with politics and public policy in Britain encouraged Muslim
groups to look to the state for recognition of their religious rights and public policy needs’ (Soper and
Fetzer 2007, 936). Overall, this has provided some considerable degree of parity between religions
over time, while elites have been relatively supportive of demands to extend rights to Muslims on
an equal basis to other minority religions, though full parity has not been achieved (Fetzer and
Soper 2005; Statham et al 2005).
In Germany, state recognition is extended to several Christian (especially Catholic) and Jewish
religious denominations as public corporations, a formal status that entails privileges, including to
receive Church taxes collected by the government, organise religious education (RE) in state schools,
and provide social welfare services (Soper and Fetzer 2007). Crucially, the German state has so far
not been willing to extend the public corporation status to Islam that it has afforded the Christian
and Jewish denominations. This requirement for formal status has proven to be a barrier that has
made it relatively difficult for Muslims to gain group rights (see e.g. Laurence 2012; Carol and Koop-
mans 2013). In addition, a strong imprint of Christianity remains in German liberalism that has been
less accommodating than the establishment Church variant in Britain. Joppke makes this point with
regard to the banning of the headscarf in Germany (2009, 123):
This is a case where Muslims are really excluded from a certain ‘Christian-occidental’ self-definition of the state,
simply because one cannot be Christian and Muslim at the same time. This is the identity that transpires in the
headscarf laws of the Catholic-conservative Länder.
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Another factor in Germany is the difficulty for migrant minorities (and Muslims) to gain access to
formal citizenship relative to France, Britain and the Netherlands (Koopmans et al. 2005). Muslims
are less able to demand parity of treatment to others when significant numbers of them remain for-
mally non-nationals and lacking in political leverage.
We see the distinct church/state relationships have been institutionalised and normatively justi-
fied as ‘opportunity structures’ (Koopmans and Statham 2000) that shape, though do not predeter-
mine, to what degree and how countries have been willing to grant religious rights to Muslims. In
this sense, France, the Netherlands, Britain and Germany offer four different models of institutional
and discursive frameworks (‘opportunities’) for Muslim group rights. Comparatively, the Dutch and
the British church/state traditions have been more open to accommodating Islam as a new minority
religion. In particular, the Dutch form of group-based pluralism inherited from ‘pillarisation’ allows
a greater and relatively equal recognition of minority religions and favourable opportunities for Mus-
lim groups to stake their claims. Britain’s relative openness and accommodating approach is more
elite-led and top-down with the aim of avoiding conflict with religious minorities. The Church of
England has importantly supported Muslim rights, but retains its position at the top of the hierarchy.
In Germany, a combination of high formal barriers to state recognition and status and relatively low
political influence due to high barriers for migrant populations to gain access to citizenship is not
conducive for Muslims. While in France, Muslims face very high barriers to religious rights, because
Christian churches have historically been denied many privileges and rights within a context of strict
state secularism. This is supported by the empirical findings of the Immigrant Citizenship Rights
Indicators (ICRI) which uses a battery of 14 indicators for each country’s policies for extending
rights to Muslims—for example, allowing Islamic religious classes in state schools; allowing Islamic
call to prayer—that are coded on a five-point scale (−1 to +1, with +1 indicating the most accom-
modating policy) (see, Carol and Koopmans 2013). According to these ICRI indicators, in 2008, the
Netherlands (0.79) and Britain (0.64) were relatively expansive for granting religious rights to Mus-
lims, while Germany (−0.11) and especially France (−0.25), were relatively restrictive (see also,
Koopmans 2013, 156).
In sum, there are two important dimensions of cross-national variation: the degree to which Mus-
lim group rights are accommodated; and the degree to which Christian religions are privileged over
others. First, the Netherlands and Britain have been relatively much more accommodating to Mus-
lim group rights than France and Germany. The second important variation is that in Britain and
Germany, the Christian churches are substantially privileged relative to other religions. By compari-
son, the Netherlands and France treat religions in a relatively more equal way, notwithstanding that
the Dutch are inclusive and the French exclusive.
Political contestation over Muslim group rights in public debates
The relationship between a state’s institutional and legal approach to accommodating Islam and the
way that ordinary people view the issues is not direct but mediated. The public debates carried by the
mass media are an especially important source of communication that shapes, but does not deter-
mine, how people interpret public problems.3 Here we compare the national public debates, so
that we have an indicator for the contestation between political actors over Muslim group rights
that is visible to ordinary people. We apply the same public claim-making approach (Koopmans
and Statham 1999) as the large body of research that uses mass-mediated public debates as a primary
source of data for analysing political contestation (see also, Koopmans et al. 2005; Koopmans and
Statham 2010; Statham and Trenz 2013).
Given the high threshold of media selectivity, public debates are dominated by elite and organised
political actors. So studying this form of contestation gives an indicator for the cues that ordinary
people face from their respective national political arenas, when they interpret and make political
sense of a public problem. In this perspective, a country’s church–state framework matters, because
(Carol and Koopmans 2013, 166),
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These differential institutional contexts define opportunity structures for claim-making about Islamic religious
rights, and explain why certain rights are highly controversial in one country, while they are hardly debated at
all in other countries, either because they are consensually accepted, or because they are consensually rejected.
There is not space to undertake a full analysis of public debates, so we draw on earlier findings from
EurIslam (Carol and Koopmans 2013), but add a new analysis that compares the overall the degrees
and forms of contestation in the four countries’ national public debates over Muslim group rights.
This matters for our study because it allows us to relate the way that (mostly elite) political actors
contest Muslim group rights back to ordinary people’s opinions on the same type of issues. Specifi-
cally, we want to examine to what degree the states’ respective approaches to Muslim rights have
faced public challenges, from (a) political party competition and (b) mobilisation by collective actors
and groups from civil society. This provides a basic idea of how much, in which direction, and from
which arena of politics, a state’s orthodoxy for extending Muslim rights has had its legitimacy visibly
challenged by political actors.
Approach, method and data
In the claim-making approach, the unit of analysis is a claim-making act:
A political claim-making act is a purposeful communicative action in the public sphere. Claim-making acts
consist of public speech acts that articulate political demands, calls to action, proposals, or criticisms, which,
actually or potentially, affect the interests or integrity of the claimants or other collective actors. (Koopmans
and Statham 2010, 55)
We use an original sample of ‘claims’ data about Muslims and Islam drawn from five newspapers per
country (varied by political affiliation, left/right, and type, broadsheet/tabloid),4 for a 10-year period,
1999–2008, prior to the survey fieldwork.
A random sample of articles with ‘claims’ about Muslims/Islam was retrieved for each country by
using keyword searches for Islam*/Muslim*/Moslem*/mosque/imam/Qur’an (Quran, Qur’an,
Koran)/headscarf/ burqa (burkha, burka, burqua)/minaret (or their respective equivalents in
national languages). Claims were included regardless of the actor type making the claims (govern-
ments, political parties, courts, Muslim organisations, employers, churches etc.) and coded by
trained research assistants using a uniform codebook.5 Detailed information is coded on a number
of variables for a claim, including: time and place; claim-making actor; action form; addressee; sub-
stantive issue of claim; position of the issue for Muslims/Islam; frame. The resultant data set has
more than 4000 claims covering a wide range of issues relevant to Muslims/Islam.
For this article, we restricted the sample to ‘evaluative claims’ (Statham et al. 2010). Evaluative
claims are where actors try to push the public debate over Muslim group rights in a decisive direction,
and are an important indicator for contestation. These are claims where an actormakes a claim that, if
realised, clearly expresses support for, or opposition to, an extension of rights for, or the position of
Muslims. Technically, thismeant excluding all claims coded ‘neutral’ or ‘ambivalent’ (0), but including
those whose realisation implies some deterioration in the rights or position of Muslims (coded −1),
and those implying an improvement (coded +1). From this, we calculate a mean score that indicates
an actor’s aggregate position over Muslim group rights, ranging from −1 restrictive to +1 expansive,
and it is possible to reconstruct each actor’s overall position, relative to other actors.
Analysis
For this analysis, we retrieved all evaluative claims on group rights for Muslims/Islam from the
samples for Britain, the Netherlands, France and Germany. We use the same definition as Carol
and Koopmans (2013, 166–167), whose study uses the same data set:
Claims about religious rights then contest entitlements regarding the performance (e.g. to be buried according
to Islamic prescriptions) or non-performance (e.g. dispensation from mixed swimming classes) of certain
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actions for religious reasons, or they are about entitlements that require others to perform (e.g. to create prayer
spaces in schools) or refrain from performing (e.g. not to depict the Prophet Mohammed) certain actions for
religious reasons.
The study by Carol and Koopmans (2013, 178–180) showed that there are striking cross-national
differences in the Muslim rights issues that become publicly controversial and that these relate to the
respective state forms of accommodation of Islam. In the relatively more restrictive countries,
Germany and France, they found that six-tenths of claims over Muslim rights strongly focused on
issues of ‘the headscarf’ and the presence of mosques and minarets. By contrast, these issues were
present but less prominent in controversies in the more accommodating Netherlands and Britain,
accounting for about a fifth of claims. In Britain and the Netherlands, controversies about full-
face covering (burqa/niqaab) and Islamic schools, as well as a lot of specialised issues, such as sharia
law, were present that were virtually absent in France and Germany. Overall, Carol and Koopmans
(2013, 186) find that settlements reached over basic rights such as headscarves and mosque construc-
tion in the Netherlands and Britain, have not quelled the controversies, but that the debate has
shifted onto new issues, and more ‘obtrusive’ and fundamental forms of demands for Muslim rights,
such as full-face covering.
Bearing in mind that these distinct issue contents show that the national debates over Muslim
rights occur on relatively different substantive trajectories, we now turn to examine the overall
degrees and forms of contestation in the four countries, based on the evaluative claims.
For group rights issues, there is a permanent numerical imbalance between the non-Muslim
majority and Muslim minority, which means that the state steps in and has a contradictory role.
On one side, the state has duties to protect and uphold the rights and identities of the minority, par-
ticularly if they are citizens, while on the other, majoritarian politics is based on the idea that state
sovereignty derives from popular will, which legitimates the notion that majority’s opinion should be
the basis for decision-making. This contradictory role of the state makes it a central actor and target
in the contentious politics over Muslim group rights, because it has to make decisions while facing
the mobilised demands of Muslims, on one side, and those by political actors from the majority
society, on the other. For this reason the decisive political conflict lines to study are the triad of
actor-relationships between state-majority; state-Muslim and majority-Muslim.
Table 1 shows the basic contours of public contestation over Muslim group rights in the four
countries. Actors are aggregated into four basic types: state and judiciary actors; legislative and pol-
itical parties; ‘native’ civil society organisations and groups; and Muslim/Islamic organisations and
groups. State and judiciary includes all institutional actors operating on behalf of the state adminis-
tration, government and judiciary. State actors ‘go public’ to legitimate, justify and re-constitute the
‘orthodox’ policy stance. Legislative and political parties covers all actors who are acting in their pub-
lic representative capacity as a legislature or political parties.6 Contestation over Muslim rights can
come in the form of party competition over the state orthodoxy. In ‘native’ civil society organisations
and groups, we include all public actors, organisations and groups that are non-Muslim. This
includes Churches, employers, and racist and anti-racist organisations and groups, among many
Table 1. National public debates over Muslim group rights: actors’ share of claims (percentage) and mean position (−1 against, to
+1 for) over issue.
Netherlands Britain France Germany
Share Position Share Position Share Position Share Position
State and judiciary 24.4% +0.37 32.3% +0.80 19.2% +0.31 42.2% −0.05
Legislative and political parties 25.0% −0.44 7.5% +0.14a 11.9% +0.63a 16.1% −0.06
‘Native’ civil society organisations and groups 33.3% +0.42 37.6% +0.83 29.6% +0.35 24.1% −0.08
Muslim/Islamic actors 17.3% +1.00 22.6% +1.00 39.3% +0.93 17.6% +0.54
All 100% +0.29 100% +0.81 100% +0.60 100% +0.05
N 156 156 93 93 135 135 199 199
aAppear in italics because n < 20 cases (n is 7 in UK; n is 16 in F).
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others, and it indicates the aggregate level of support for Muslim rights mobilised by civil society
from the majority population. Last, Muslim/Islamic includes organisations and groups that have a
collective identity that is explicitly representative of the Muslim community. For each country,
the first column shows a collective actor’s share, and the second its mean position (−1 restrictive
to +1 expansive), in claim-making for Muslim religious rights.
In Britain, we see that the state takes a strong advocacy position (+0.80) supporting Muslim rights
in a context where these are significantly granted. This orthodox state position stimulates few claims
from political parties (7.5%), and is strongly supported by organisations and groups from the ‘native’
majority (37.6%; +0.83), and also by Muslim organisations and groups (22.6%; +1). Overall, the pub-
lic debate that is visible in Britain shows few signs of opposition and provides strong advocacy sup-
porting Muslim group rights.
In the Netherlands, where Muslim rights are also significantly granted, the state’s position is sup-
portive (+0.37) but less decisively so than in Britain. We see that the state orthodoxy has faced an
important oppositional challenge from party politics (25%; −0.44) in the period 1999–2008. Closer
inspection shows that this strong opposition came from the Party for Freedom (Partij voor de Vrij-
heid, PVV). Since 2005, this radical right party associated with Geert Wilders has campaigned
strongly on an explicitly anti-Islamic agenda, for example, against the ‘Islamisation of the Nether-
lands’, and won 24 seats in the 2010 general election. However, this challenge to the state’s orthodoxy
on Muslim rights is not replicated by mobilisation of organisations and groups from Dutch civil
society. ‘Native’ civil society organisations and groups mobilise significantly and support Muslim
rights (33.3%; +0.42). Finally, Muslim organisations and groups’ advocacy (17.3%; +1) challenges
the state to do more.
Turning to France, we see that Muslims themselves have a strong presence in the debate and
advocate strongly for extension of rights to Islam (39.3%; +0.93). As a result of the relatively open
access to national citizenship for migrants in France (Koopmans et al 2005), there a large number
of French citizens who are Muslims. Possessing citizenship seems to empower French Muslims to
make demands for an extension of rights for their community. Also, in the context of a state
orthodoxy of laïcité that is restrictive to religious rights, we find little overt opposition to expanding
Muslim rights. The French state (19.2%; +0.31), parties (11.9%; +0.63) and ‘native’ civil society
(29.6%; +0.35) relatively support Muslim rights. This shows a degree of willingness from the French
state and representatives of the majority population for some extension of Muslim rights, albeit from
a situation where these are not already granted to anything like the same degree as Britain and the
Netherlands.
In Germany, the state is the dominant actor in the public debate over Muslim rights and neither
advocates nor opposes an extension (42.2%; −0.05), a position that is less supportive than the states
in the other three countries. Political parties (16.1%; −0.06) and ‘native’ German civil society (24.1%;
−0.08) take positions that are identical to the state orthodoxy. This shows that there is on balance
little contestation against the German state orthodoxy from the representatives of majority society.
Relative to the other countries, Muslims in Germany find less potential support from allies among
‘native’ civil society and the state and little overall support for an extension of Muslim rights. In a
country where the Muslim population of migrant origin faces much higher barriers to access citizen-
ship than in the other three countries (Koopmans et al. 2005), and the state prioritizes Christian reli-
gions, Muslims organisations and groups stand alone in their advocacy for Muslim rights (+0.54),
while some even publicly oppose this extension.7
Overall, we find a public debate in Britain where the state, and majority and Muslim civil society
organisations and groups are strong advocates of Islamic rights. In the Netherlands, mobilised oppo-
sition by a radical right party challenges the state and native civil society, who support Muslim rights,
but relatively less so than Muslim organisations and groups themselves. In France, Muslims have a
strong presence in the debate over Muslim rights, and receive some encouragement from the state
and French civil society organisations and groups. Finally, in Germany, the state is a strong presence
in the debate, and along with political parties and native civil society organisations, is neutral over
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extending Muslim groups rights. It seems that Muslims in Germany have not yet gained a foothold in
debates over their own access to group rights.
‘Gaps’ between majorities and Muslims over group rights?8
Individual-level data on public opinion is often used to test explanatory models for inter-group
relations and hostility to outgroups of immigrant origin (e.g. Strabac and Listhaug 2008; van der
Noll and Saroglu 2015) or from other religions (Koopmans 2015). By contrast, our research objective
in analysing cross-national survey data is to verify the size of the ‘gaps’ in opinions between the non-
Muslim majority and Muslims, empirically. This gives an indicator for the socio-cultural distance
between the majority and Muslim minorities in the respective countries based on their relative
degree of acceptance of Muslim group rights.
Approach, method and data
This article uses data from our original survey conducted within the EU Framework seven project
EurIslam9 (see introduction to this special issue) to gauge the way that ordinary people view Muslim
rights issues. The data set was collected through Computer Assisted Telephone Interviews in 2010/
2011. The survey oversamples people with a migrant background and includes more than 7000 inter-
views. In each country, interviews were undertaken with migrant minorities from the most impor-
tant Muslim origin countries (former-Yugoslavia; Turkey; Pakistan; Morocco) in the countries of
settlement that we investigate. This ‘Muslim’ sample was drawn by onomastic procedure, that is,
common family and first names were sampled from the latest electronic phonebooks, then respon-
dents were screened to see if they, or at least one of their parents, were Muslims and from our
selected countries of origin. Bi-lingual interviewers were used so that Muslim respondents could
choose the language of their settlement or origin country. In addition, we collected a sample of
the majority population who are not Muslims. This ‘Majority’ sample was collected randomly in
each country. Efforts were made to ensure that there was a gender balance in all samples.10
From the large number of survey questions, we selected those about three issues that relate expli-
citly to an extension of religious group rights, and which have been the subject of public controver-
sies about the relationship between the state and Muslims in Europe: (1) allowing the construction of
mosques with visible minarets; (2) allowing religious symbols on schoolteachers’ clothing and (3) the
provision of RE in the school curriculum. For the issues about schoolteachers’ clothing and provision
of RE, we are able to compare responses about the religious rights for Christianity and Islam.
We took a research decision to analyse variations between groups within a country, instead of
comparing groups regardless of country. The thinking here is that our respondents live in four dis-
tinct national legal, policy and interpretative contexts for understanding Muslim group rights. This
has been established empirically by studies on church/state relations (see earlier), including those
using indicators (see ICRI above), and on public discourse (see Carol and Koopmans 2013 and
above). Because there are significant national differences for accommodating Muslim group rights,
opinions that respondents express for or against them mean something substantively different
depending on their respective national country context. A member of the public living in Britain,
whose child may go to a school where a teacher wears a religious headscarf, is institutionally and
legally empowered to do so, and where if politicians speak about this at all, do so in supportive
tones, is clearly relating to a different conceptual and institutional world than someone in France,
where all this would be an inconceivable and legally impossible. The ‘normal’ in Britain and France
is very different precisely because of their distinct approaches to accommodating Islam as a minority
religion. This means that respondents to our survey questions place themselves on a scale of agree-
ment/disagreement for a proposition over religious rights within a context that is national. For this
study, we consider that the scales for agreement/disagreement in the survey questions are best
employed measuring the relative differences in opinions between individuals (from the majority
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and minority groups) within a country, because the scales do not substantively mean the same thing
across the four countries.
In addition, we recognise that ‘Muslim’ covers a variety of national backgrounds, ethnic, religious
and racial groups. Although our primary interest is the ‘gap’ between the majority and Muslim
groups, we try to avoid the common pitfall of lumping all Muslims together, by also allowing for
examination of the variation between groups of Muslim immigrant origin from four countries of ori-
gin (former-Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Morocco and Turkey). This enables us to examine the differences
in opinion between the majority and each of the four Muslim groups, as well as identifying variations
between Muslim groups, where these are also relevant to the discussion.
Analysis
To analyse the responses we conducted five (group: native; ex-Yugoslavian; Moroccan; Turkish;
Pakistani) × two (gender: male; female) two-way analyses of covariance (ANCOVA) controlling
for age, educational level and income, for each country. We include age, education, and income
as covariates, and gender as an independent variable, to see whether our findings hold, regardless
of generational differences, whether people are better educated or not, or how much they earn,
and whether gender matters.
In ANCOVA the test of whether groups’means are the same is represented by the F-ratio and an
associated significance value. A first general finding is that gender does not affect results, while group
belonging matters a great deal in explaining variance. In the 20 tests undertaken (i.e. analyses within
each of four countries for five survey questions on the three issues), we found gender to be significant
at the p < .05 level in only three instances. By contrast, F tests showed that group variance by group
(native, ex-Yugoslavian, Moroccan, Pakistani, Turkish) was very highly significant at p < .001 in each
of the 20 tests undertaken (see bottom row in relevant tables below). For this reason, we focus in the
following on group differences within the four countries, respectively.
We include tables that show the means adjusted for the effects of covariates, and level of signifi-
cance of Bonferonni-corrected pairwise comparisons of these means. Specifically, our tables show the
adjusted means and significance of the differences between the native group and the four groups of
Muslim origin, since these were much greater than the differences between the four groups of
Muslims.
Allowing minarets on the skyline?
A first clear indicator for the acceptance of Islam as an immigrant religion concerns whether people
think that it should be possible to build mosques with minarets. While Church spires are a common
feature on the skyline across Europe, the question arises whether Muslim minorities should be
granted the right to have mosques that make minarets visible in the physical public space of their
country of settlement. Accepting minarets on the skyline is a visible symbolic marker for including
Islam within a country’s public space.
Before examining respondents’ opinions, it is first necessary to provide a basic idea of the cross-
national variations in states’ permitting the construction of visible minarets. There is no space for
detailed coverage, but we use the information provided and publicly accessible by the ICRI indicators
on national policies for extending group rights to Muslims. We use the 2008 ICRI data, which is the
closest time-point to when our survey was held. The ICRI findings on the countries’ policies for
allowing the construction of mosques with minarets show that laïc France is the least accommodat-
ing compared to Britain, the Netherlands and Germany, though it notes that the German case has
moved in this direction only just before 2008, relative to Britain and the Netherlands. By 2008, this
gives the following outcomes: Britain had about 1500 visible mosques serving a Muslim population
of 1.5–2 million, the Netherlands about 20 for 850,000–1 million, Germany between 40 and 160 for
3.5 million, while by contrast France had only about 15 for 4.5 million Muslims.
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Our survey question is: ‘Several aspects of state-religion relations have recently been under dis-
cussion in <France/Germany/the Netherlands/the UK>. Do you agree or disagree with the following
statements? The construction of minarets should be allowed on <French/German/Dutch/British>
territory.’
Table 2 shows the main findings of the Bonferonni-corrected pairwise comparisons. The scores
show the adjusted means for a group’s responses on a four-point scale, ranging from 1 ‘agree
strongly’, to 2 ‘agree’, to 3 ‘disagree’, to 4 ‘disagree strongly’. A mean above 2.5 rising towards 4 indi-
cates a group’s increasing disagreement, while one below 2.5 decreasing to 1, indicates increasing
agreement. The columns show the results within each country. The ‘Majority’ row gives the adjusted
mean score for the non-Muslim sample. The subsequent four rows show adjusted means for the four
Muslim groups (ex-Yugoslavian; Pakistani; Moroccan; Turkish), respectively. The * symbol shows
when this opinion is highly significantly different from the ‘majority’ opinion (at *p < .05, **p
< .01, *** p < .001). The ‘Muslim’ mean is a score calculated from the means of the four Muslim
groups (weighted) per country. Last, the ‘Gap’ from the Majority to the Muslim is calculated by
the majority mean opinion minus the Muslims’ aggregated mean (per country). An overall plus
‘gap’ figure shows the degree to which that Muslims are more in agreement with a proposition
than the majority.
First, we see that all four groups of Muslim origin (ex-Yugoslavian; Pakistani; Moroccan; Turkish)
are highly significantly different (p < .001) from the majority in every country. This shows a dissen-
sus among respondents over having minarets in their country that runs along Majority/Muslim lines.
Differences between the majority and Muslims are very much significantly greater than differences
between the groups of Muslims. Among Muslims, we see that groups from former-Yugoslavia are
closer to the majority view in each country, but still highly significantly different from the majority.
Second, from the aggregate Muslim adjusted mean, we see that Muslims ‘agree’ that minarets
should be allowed in all countries. They agree more strongly in France (1.71) where this happens
least, and Germany (1.75) where it has started only since 2002, compared to the Netherlands
(1.98) and Britain (1.88) where this has been permitted for relatively longer.
Third, turning to the majority population, while the Dutch (2.42), German (2.39) and French
(2.45) are close to ‘neutral’ and just on the scale towards agreement, the British non-Muslims
(2.93) clearly ‘disagree’ with minarets. Turning to the overall Majority-Muslim ‘gaps’ this produces,
we see that the cultural distance is smallest in the Netherlands (0.44), and then Germany (0.64), com-
pared to France (0.74). Broadly this follows what we would expect from the three countries’ policies
for accommodating Islam. However, the striking exception is Britain, which has the largest Majority-
Muslim ‘gap’ (1.05) over this Muslim group right, despite being a country that has significantly
allowed minarets. This large ‘gap’ in Britain comes from an unexpectedly strong majority opinion
that is against minarets, compared to the majorities in other countries, while the British Muslim
opinion is as we would expect similar to that in the Netherlands, the other country where minarets
Table 2. Agreement/disagreement with allowing construction of minarets in country of residence, by group (scale 1–4: agree
strongly 1; agree 2; disagree 3; disagree strongly 4).
Netherlands Britain France Germany
Mean Mean Mean Mean
Majority 2.42 2.93 2.45 2.39
Ex-Yugo 2.13*** 2.03*** 1.90*** 1.91***
Pakistani 1.93*** 1.71*** 1.62*** 1.50***
Moroccan 1.86*** 1.86*** 1.70*** 1.83***
Turkish 2.00*** 1.92*** 1.61*** 1.76***
Muslim 1.98 1.88 1.71 1.75
‘Gap’: Majority to Muslim 0.44 1.05 0.74 0.64
F test on group effect F (4, 1175) = 28.27,
p < .001
F (4, 1472) = 173.41,
p < .001
F (4, 1172) = 39.06,
p < .001
F (4, 1405) = 37.00,
p < .001
Note: Group of predominantly Muslim origin significantly different from ‘native’ at *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001—Bonferroni
pairwise comparison.
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have been relatively numerous and visible on the skyline for some time. It is striking that our respon-
dents from the British majority population express clear disagreement with the accommodating
approach that political elites have taken over this issue, not least when we recall that Muslim
group rights were also least contested in British public debates. This finding seems to indicate a
gap between British policies and elites’ public stances that are relatively supportive of Muslim
group rights, on one side, and the opinions of ordinary British non-Muslims, on the other.
Allowing teachers to wear religious symbols in schools?
It is well established that states have historically used education systems as an important agent for
nation-building (Gellner 1983), and that state schools remain important agents for socialising the
next generation into the values, identities and ideas of who belongs to a national community.
This is also why schools have regularly been the institutional location for public and legal disputes
over the place of religion in society, generally, and over the place of Islam. Conflicts over whether
pupils or teachers can wear veils or crucifixes in the state-controlled environment of the public
school have been a regular field for the so-called ‘culture clashes’, where religious values, and in par-
ticular the values of Islam, are seen to challenge those of the state. Teachers perform a special role in
schools as public servants acting on behalf of, and as employees of, the state. Hence the degree to
which teachers are banned from wearing religious symbols in conducting their professional roles
indicates a state’s position over accommodating a religion.
Regarding actual situations in our four countries, again, the ICRI indicators demonstrate cross-
national variations in policies. In 2008, no religious symbols at all were allowed in French public pri-
mary and secondary schools. Britain and the Netherlands were more accommodating. Teachers were
permitted to wear the Islamic veil, while Christian religious symbols were already accepted parts of
state education. In Germany, Christianity was strongly present in German education, while teachers
had been banned from wearing the veil in a number of States, although the Federal Court had ruled
at the Federal level that there was no clear legal basis for this in 2003.
While the minarets question looked only at opinions on a provision for Muslim group rights, we
have two questions on teachers’ attire and religious symbols: one on Christian symbols and clothing,
and the other on the Islamic veil. This allows us to compare respondents’ opinions over provision for
the majority religion and for Islam. It provides a more nuanced understanding of the majority and
Muslim minority groups’ views over religious rights, for Christian religions and Islam, relative to one
another.
After the same introduction used for the minaret question, the survey queries whether respon-
dents agree or disagree with two statements:
(a) Teachers in public schools should not be allowed to wear visible Christian symbols such as a
cross or a nun’s habit.
(b) Teachers in public schools should not be allowed to wear a Veil.
Note that the questions are worded negatively, so that agreement indicates an opinion against reli-
gious symbols. However, to follow the same interpretive logic as Table 2 on allowing minarets, and
subsequent tables, we adjusted the data in the Table 3(a) and 3(b), so that a mean above 2.5 moving
towards 4 indicates increasing disagreement with an extension of religious rights, and below 2.5
towards 1, increasing agreement.
Table 3(a) shows findings on teachers wearing symbols and clothing associated with the majority
Christian religions. First, we see the strong imprint of laïcité in the opinions of the Frenchmajority and
Muslimminority relative to those in other countries. The Frenchmajority respondents (2.93) have the
strongest disagreement with teachers being allowed to wear Christian symbols of all groups, and are
the only group apart from Moroccan Muslims in France (2.60), and former-Yugoslavian Muslims in
Britain (2.69), who register on the disagreement side of the scale. By contrast, in the countries where
the state incorporates Christian religions to a greater degree, and allows teachers to wear clothes sig-
nifying Christianity, respondents from the majority are clearly against banning Christian symbols.
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This applies to theNetherlands (2.30), but to a greater degree toGermany (2.23), and especially Britain
(1.90), the two countries where the state significantly privileges Christian religions.
Second, turning to Muslim respondents, their overall positions in countries where the state
incorporates Christianity, the Netherlands (2.07), Britain (2.29) and Germany (2.20), ‘agree’
with permitting Christian symbols for teachers’ attire. This Muslim support for Christian symbols
in state schools is most likely because Muslims understand that an expansion of group rights for
Islam is often best legitimated by a demand for parity with the majority religion. It is harder for
liberal states to deny rights to some that that are already extended to others (Joppke 2009). Even in
laïc France, the overall Muslim mean (2.48) is equivalent to ‘neutral’, showing neither support nor
opposition to Christianity in schools in a context where it is denied. So overall, we witness no Mus-
lim opposition to the actual (or in France possible) state accommodation of Christianity in this
form. This goes against the idea of a ‘Christianity versus Islam’ boundary along religious divisions
driven and constructed by Muslim minorities. On the contrary, Muslims’ relative support for
Christian religious rights is indicative of a more pragmatic approach to their own religious
accommodation.
Regarding the ‘gaps’ between the majority and Muslim minorities over Christian group rights, it is
only in France that the symbolic presence of Christianity in schools clearly divides the majority and
all four resident Muslim minority groups. Here the strong imprint of laïcité in the French majority’s
opinions, who on aggregate ‘disagree’ with teachers wearing Christian symbols in schools, means
that former-Yugoslavians, Pakistanis and Turks are highly significantly different from the majority,
while Moroccans just miss significance at the .05 level (p = .07).
However, when we turn to opinions over teachers wearing the Muslim veil, we see from Table 3
(b) that there is a clear dividing line between the majority population and Muslim minorities in all
four countries. The opinions of all four groups of Muslim origin in all four settlement countries are
highly significantly (p < .001) different from the majority view, with the exception of former-Yugo-
slavians in the Netherlands and Germany. AmongMuslims, Table 3(a) and 3(b) show that those who
most likely came as refugees from the ethno-religious wars that tore Yugoslavia apart, tend to be less
in favour of religious rights, than Muslims with origins in Pakistan, Morocco and Turkey.
Table 3. Agreement/disagreement with teachers being allowed to wear (a) visible Christian symbols in country of residence, by
group and (b) Veil, by group (scale 1–4: agree strongly 1; agree 2; disagree 3; disagree strongly 4).
Netherlands Britain France Germany
Mean Mean Mean Mean
(a) Wearing Christian symbols
Majority 2.30 1.90 2.93 2.23
Ex-Yugo 2.20 2.69*** 2.45*** 2.30
Pakistani 2.09 2.01 2.36*** 2.06
Moroccan 1.80*** 2.05 2.60+ 2.03
Turkish 2.19 2.40*** 2.53** 2.41
Muslim 2.07 2.29 2.48 2.20
‘Gap’: Majority to Muslim 0.23 −0.39 0.45 0.03
F test on group effect F (4, 1175) = 9.91,
p < .001
F (4, 1472) = 14.98,
p < .001
F (4, 1172) = 23.95,
p < .001
F (4, 1405) = 7.012,
p < .001
(b) Wearing the Veil
Majority 2.48 3.64 3.16 2.76
Ex-Yugo 2.32 2.52*** 2.73** 2.62
Pakistani 2.02*** 2.33*** 2.35*** 1.93***
Moroccan 1.73*** 2.14*** 2.34*** 2.10***
Turkish 2.14*** 2.31*** 2.37*** 2.25***
Muslim 2.05 2.33 2.45 2.23
‘Gap’: Majority to Muslim 0.43 1.31 0.71 0.53
F test on group effect F (4, 1175) = 19.53,
p < .001
F (4, 1472) = 279.33,
p < .001
F (4, 1172) = 58.41,
p < .001
F (4, 1405) = 21.27,
p < .001
Note: Group of predominantly Muslim origin significantly different from ‘native’ at *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001—Bonferroni
pairwise comparison. + Moroccan in France just misses significance (.07).
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By comparing Table 3(a) and 3(b), we can unpack some important features of the changes in
opinion that occur as the question shifts from group rights for Christians to Muslims. First, the over-
all aggregate Muslim means are remarkably similar for teachers’ wearing Christian or Islamic sym-
bols across all countries (Christian v. Islam: NL: 2.07 v 2.05; UK: 2.29 v 2.33; F: 2.48 v 2.45; D: 2.20 v
2.23). This shows that Muslims agree to accommodating religious symbols in state schools for their
own and the majority Christian religions to the same degree. Again, we think that this similar level of
support for their own minority religion and Christianity comes from the importance of demanding
parity with a majority religion for advancing Muslim group rights. However, it demonstrates a
second important feature of the significant ‘gap’ between the majority and Muslims over teachers
wearing the veil, namely, that it is produced by a change in the opinions of respondents from the
majority populations as the question shifts from Christian to Muslim rights. It is the majority popu-
lations’ opposition to the veil that drives the relationship and produces the significant ‘gaps’. Only in
the Netherlands (2.48) where teachers can wear the veil does the majority remain ‘neutral’ overall,
while in Germany (2.76), and especially in France (3.16) and Britain (3.64), the majority agrees
strongly with banning teachers from wearing the veil. This may not be a surprise for the France,
where the veil is banned for teachers, nor Germany where there is a mixed policy, but where
again the veil is banned in a number of States. However, the British majority’s very strong opposition
is exceptional in that it goes directly against the country’s policies for not banning teachers’ from
wearing the veil.
Here it is worth pointing out that the shift in majority opinions when the question moves from
Christian to Muslim rights is largest in Britain (1.74) and then Germany (0.53), compared to the
Netherlands (0.18) and France (0.23). Britain and Germany are the two countries whose church/
state accommodations especially privilege Christian religions over other religions, while the Nether-
lands is relatively more equally accommodating to all religions, and France equally unaccommodat-
ing to all. From this, it seems that granting special privileges to Christian religions over others
provides legitimacy for majorities to also discriminate in their views and support provision for Chris-
tians, but not Muslims. For Britain, the argument is that maintaining the status of a privileged state
Church, the Church of England, does more to uphold a sense of Christian privilege in the minds of
the majority than the extension of Muslim group rights does to undermine it. The British majority
clearly agree with teachers being allowed to wear Christian symbols and attire, but disagree strongly
with an extension of this right to Muslims, even though this is what actually happens. In Germany,
where Muslims communities have less of a foothold in society, generally, because of restrictive citi-
zenship, and Christian churches are clearly granted privileges that are not extended to Islam, this
discriminating stance of the majority in prioritising Christian rights is less surprising.
In sum, the British findings are especially striking. The British majority’s strong agreement with
banning teachers from wearing the veil produces a large ‘gap’ between Muslims and non-Muslims
(1.31) that is almost twice the size of that in France (0.71), where the laïcité conditions make teachers
wearing a veil an absolute non-starter. We should recall that this occurs in the context of a British
public debate where extending Muslim group rights is significantly supported and largely uncon-
tested. There seems to be a large gap between the favourable elite-dominated British public debates
and the oppositional views of ordinary people from the majority over extending religious rights to
Muslims.
Allowing Religious Education in schools?
A final query to test opinions on whether group rights should be included within the public insti-
tutional fabric of state provision addresses RE in state schooling. We replicate the design applied
for teachers’ clothing and religious symbols and ask questions that allow comparison between pro-
vision for the Christian and Islam religions. In part, this is to verify whether earlier findings hold,
given that references to the veil might have provoked atypical emotive responses from respondents,
or that the negative wording of the question might have produced distorting effects. The focus on the
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place of majority and minority religions in the curriculum of state education goes to the core of ques-
tions about the public and institutional incorporation of religion, not least because it is through their
education systems that states seek to promote and generate their preferred values and national
identities.
With regard to the factual state of affairs facing our respondents, again, ICRI is our source for the
basic variations in national policy contexts. In 2008, Britain, the Netherlands and Germany allowed
provision for Christian RE but had not extended this to Islamic RE on an equal basis. In Britain,
parents were able to request that local councils on RE install Islamic classes. This has led some
state schools to offer Islamic RE in areas with a dense Muslim population. Similarly, in the Nether-
lands, there is a partial form of acceptance. In Germany, there had only been a few pilot projects for
Islamic RE classes by 2008, with the main barrier being the subordinate position of Islam relative to
the Christian religions within the state’s hierarchy of religious recognition. In France, the exclusion
of all religious instruction from state schooling meant that the provision for Islamic RE was a non-
starter.
The survey asks whether respondents agree or disagree with two statements:
(a) Public schools should offer Christian religious education for those who want it.
(b) Public schools should offer Muslim religious education for those who want it.
Table 4(a) shows the adjusted means for groups’ opinions over Christian RE in state schools. In
line with the findings on religious attire, the main dividing line is between laïc France and the three
countries where state education includes Christian Churches to a greater degree. First, the impact of
laïcité is clear on the French majority’s opinions (2.80), they are the only group who on aggregate
‘disagree’ with Christian RE for those who want it. By contrast, all four groups of Muslim origin
in France agree with the proposition to a degree that is highly significantly different (p < .001)
from the majority. This produces a ‘gap’ between the French majority and Muslims (0.71) that is
significantly wider than in the Netherlands (0.18), Britain (0.10) and Germany (0.22), where there
is a relative majority and Muslim consensus in favour of this right for Christians. Support for
Table 4. Agreement/disagreement with schools offering (a) Christian religious education and (b) Muslim religious education to
those who want it in country of residence, by group (scale 1–4: agree strongly 1; agree 2; disagree 3; disagree strongly 4).
Netherlands Britain France Germany
Mean Mean Mean Mean
(a) Christian RE in
schools
Majority 2.32 2.15 2.80 1.57
Ex-Yugo 2.25 2.27 2.30*** 1.79
Pakistani 2.01*** 1.86*** 1.84*** 1.67
Moroccan 2.00*** 2.01 2.15*** 1.85***
Turkish 2.29 2.05 2.07*** 1.86***
Muslim 2.14 2.05 2.09 1.79
‘Gap’: Majority to
Muslim
0.18 0.10 0.71 −0.22
F test on group effect F (4, 1175) = 15.36,
p < .001
F (4, 1472) = 47.49,
p < .001
F (4, 1172) = 8.36,
p < .001
F (4, 1405) = 7.37,
p < .001
(b) Muslim RE in
schools
Majority 2.56 2.75 3.01 2.17
Ex-Yugo 2.43 1.96*** 2.41*** 1.87***
Pakistani 2.07*** 1.55*** 1.66*** 1.50***
Moroccan 2.02*** 1.55*** 1.84*** 1.77***
Turkish 2.25*** 1.72*** 2.07*** 1.70***
Muslim 2.19 1.69 2.00 1.71
‘Gap’: Majority to
Muslim
0.37 1.06 1.01 0.46
F test on group effect F (4, 1175) = 31.90, p
< .001
F (4, 1472) = 177.82, p
< .001
F (4, 1172) = 25.16, p
< .001
F (4, 1405) = 30.18, p
< .001
Note: Group of predominantly Muslim origin significantly different from ‘native’ at *p < .05, **p < .01, *** p < .001—Bonferroni
pairwise comparison.
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Christian religious instruction in schools is especially strong among the German majority (1.57). But
it is also evident for the British majority (2.15), who like their German counterparts live in a country
where the state especially privileges Christian religions over others. In the Netherlands, where reli-
gious accommodation is relatively more equal across different religions, the Dutch majority (2.32) on
aggregate favours Christian RE, but less decisively. Turning to the Muslim aggregate means, we see
that in all countries Muslims broadly ‘agree’ with Christian RE provision (NL 2.14; UK 2.05; F 2.09;
D 1.79). This confirms the earlier finding that Muslims tend to support Christian rights, probably
thinking that this is more conducive for a spill over of rights to their own religion. Again, this indi-
cates a pragmatic stance, with no evidence of a sizeable Muslim opposition to Christianity simply
because it is a different religion anywhere.
When the question shifts to state provision of RE for Muslims (Table 4(b)), we also find a similar
overall pattern to the earlier findings on teachers’ wearing religious attire. First, there are clearly
divided opinions in all countries between the majority and Muslims. With the exception of for-
mer-Yugoslavians in the Netherlands, all groups with Muslim origins in all countries are highly sig-
nificantly (<.001) different in their views to the majority, and more in agreement with allowing
Islamic RE.
Once more we see that Muslims in the Netherlands, France and Germany, hold similar views on
RE provision for Christians and Muslims. It is only in Britain where Muslims shift in their views
(0.36) to be more in agreement with this right for themselves than for Christians. Also, among
the Muslims groups, the former-Yugoslavians are relatively less in favour of this Muslim group
right than the others, but with the exception of the Netherlands, much closer to the Pakistani, Mor-
occan and Turkish groups than the majority.
Again following the pattern we observed earlier, it is the majority groups’ relative shift in opinion
against provision for Muslims compared to Christians that leads to important ‘gaps’ between the
majority population and Muslims. Also this shift in majority opinions is greatest in Britain (Chris-
tian 2.15 v. Muslim 2.75 = 0.60) and Germany (Christian 1.57 v. Muslim 2.17 = 0.60), the two
countries that privilege Christian religions in their state accommodation over other religions. The
shift is less pronounced in the Netherlands (0.24), where state accommodation generally treats reli-
gions more equally, and France (0.21), where they are all relatively equally excluded.
The overall findings bear some imprints of the countries’ respective forms of Church–state
accommodation. French majority-supported state laïcité leads to a wide Majority/Muslim gap
(1.01) and few prospects for an extension of religious rights to Muslims. The French majority are
unlikely to support rights for Muslims that are denied to Christians. In the Netherlands, where
the state treats religions relatively equally and RE for Muslims is partially accommodated, the
Majority/Muslim gap (0.37) remains significant, but is the smallest of the four countries. In
Germany, state inclusion of (especially) Christian religions but not Islam, leads to an overall strong
majority support for religious provision compared to other countries, but also a relatively strong
reaction by the majority against specific provision for Muslims (German ‘gap’: 0.46). We also see
a similarly strong reaction by the British majority respondents when the question switches from pro-
vision for Christians to provision to Muslims. In the British case, this is supplemented by an asser-
tiveness of Muslims for an extension of rights to them relative to Christians.
The British findings are remarkable. For a country with some degree of state accommodation for
religious classes for Muslims, it is striking that the British majority shows a clear opposition to this
policy and makes a very clear distinction in its support for Christian rights and opposition to extend-
ing the same rights for Muslims. Conversely, British Muslims support Christian rights, but advocate
support for their own religious rights to a greater degree, no doubt encouraged to expect ‘parity’ from
an institutional system that goes a long way to providing it on many issues. As a consequence, we
witness a polarisation between the opinions of the majority and Muslims in Britain as the question
shifts from Christian to Muslim provision. This results in a striking ‘gap’ (1.06) along ethno-religious
lines between the British Muslims and non-Muslims, driven from both sides. It is indicative of a clear
dissensus in the views of ordinary people and a potential for conflict between the British majority and
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Muslims over Muslim group rights. Recall also, that all this occurs in a country with relatively
accommodating policies and a highly supportive public debate for extending rights to Muslims,
and where there is little evidence for mobilised public opposition to Muslim group rights by political
parties or from civil society.
Discussion
The primary aim of this article was to examine how ordinary members of the public view the state’s
accommodation of Muslim group rights within their respective countries. We found that regardless
of the degree to which, and how, states have accommodated Islam, there are highly significant ‘gaps’
between the opinions of the majority populations and Muslims over what the provision of Muslim
group rights for should be, respectively, in all four countries. A wide socio-cultural distance exists
between non-Muslim majorities and Muslims over these issues, with Muslims being clearly more
in favour of an extension of rights for their group, while facing varying degrees of opposition
from the majority. In everyday life, ordinary Muslims and non-Muslims seem to be no closer to a
consensus over the ‘fair’ limits for accommodating Islam.
This ‘gap’ persists in the Netherlands and Britain, which shows that significantly extending Mus-
lim rights does not seem to bring majorities and Muslims to a consensus.
Also the ‘gap’ holds and is highly significant between the majorities and each of the four groups of
Muslims from different countries of origin (former-Yugoslavia, Pakistan, Morocco and Turkey) in
each country.11 Conversely, differences between the four Muslim groups were seldom significant.
Given this degree of internal consensus among different Muslim groups relative to their dissensus
with their respective national majorities, it does seem possible to speak of a ‘Muslim’ opinion
over Muslim group rights within a country.
We were able to gain access to important information on the nature and source of the ‘gap’ by
comparing the majorities’ and Muslims’ opinions on state provision for Christians versus Muslims.
First, we found that Muslims tend to support state provisions for the majority Christian and their
own religion to the same degree. This is most likely because Muslims see better opportunities to
advance their own group rights through a context that supports all religious group rights. Second,
by contrast the majority populations tend to support state provision for Christian rights substantially
more than for Islam. Importantly, it is the majorities’ opinions that change and turn against group
rights as the demand shifts from provision for Christians to Muslims. This shift in majorities’
opinions drives the relationship and results in a significant gap between non-Muslims and Muslims.
Our findings demonstrate that majority opinions matter a great deal in determining the potential for
controversy over Muslim group rights.
Here there is a crucial methodological point. We were able to reveal the importance of majorities
in generating the ‘gap’ only because our sample included Muslims and non-Muslims, and our
research design allowed comparison between responses about the majority Christian religion and
Islam. Future surveys need to include these considerations into their sampling and design. If we
had not included a majority sample, then we would have lost the important reference point for
understanding the problematic and which provided our key findings.12
Regarding cross-national variations, we found that the shift in majority opinions for supporting
Christian versus Islam provision was greatest in Britain and Germany, the two countries where
state accommodation clearly prioritises Christian religions above others. The shift was markedly
less in Netherlands, which is relatively more accommodating across religions, and France that is
relatively equally restrictive to all. This is not to suggest that people in Britain and Germany see
themselves as more Christian than those in the Netherlands, but that they find greater legitimacy
for placing Christianity over Islam and in doing so they repeat the discrimination within their
country’s approach to religious accommodation. While many members of the native population
are not practising Christians, or even religious, they will have grown up and been socialised, for
example, in schools, where the specific national church–state accommodation was embedded
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into their experiences of public life. For Germans and Brits, the primacy of the Christian religions
is part of the national heritage, values and identity that has accompanied them on their journey
through life. In this sense, their opposition to extending group rights to Muslims can be a prefer-
ence for maintaining the status quo (against change) and need not be an indicator for outright hos-
tility against Islam as a religion or Muslims. This majority stance does however run against the
views and expectations of Muslims, especially in Britain, where the state—often encouraged by
its own Church of England—has significantly extended religious rights to Muslims and publicly
legitimated the idea that this will continue.
Notwithstanding this explanation, the strength of British majority opposition to Muslim group
rights is exceptional and runs through our findings. The British findings completely contradict
the notion that accommodating policies lead to closer opinions between the majority and Muslims.
Britain has accommodating policies for Islam and a highly supportive and consensual public debate
that legitimates expansive Muslim rights. However, this is combined with a majority public opinion
that strongly opposes Muslim rights to a degree that it produces the widest ‘gaps’, even compared to
laïc France.
There is no evident problem with the British data. It was collected in the same way and with the
same rigour as the other data sets, it meets the quality standards of other comparable projects, and
the findings have been controlled for age, education and income. Nor is the make-up of our sample
of ‘Brits’ importantly different from the general population (see Carol 2013). Although the opinion
data is limited because it presents only a ‘snapshot’ at one time-point, there was no exceptional event
during data collection that would account for a strong majority opposition.
Accepting the British findings as a ‘fact’, how do we explain the apparent ‘gap’ between supportive
policies and public debates on one side, and an oppositional majority public opinion on the other?
We think that political context matters and refer back to our findings on the degree and form of con-
testation within public debates.
Our starting thesis is that the public presence of a recognisable anti-Islam party has a sort of
pressure valve ‘effect’, i.e., it specifies issues in a way that makes positions and outcomes visible
and clear in the public domain, which has the effect of bringing the opinions of the rest of majority
society together against the anti-Islam stance.
Here the comparison between Britain and the Netherlands is instructive. The Dutch public debate is
less supportive ofMuslim rights andmore contentious. Anti-Islamicmobilisation byWilders’ PVVpol-
itical party shifts the debate in a restrictive direction, but the state still publicly legitimatesMuslim group
rights and has an ally in organised Dutch civil society. Turning to public opinion, this produces a ‘gap’
between the Dutch majority and Muslims that is the smallest in spite of the impact of Wilders’mobil-
isation. When people can hear a virulent anti-Islamic political ‘voice’ (Wilders’ PVV) that is highly vis-
ible, publicly resonant, and has a degree of legitimacy through its presence in the institutional polity,
many sections of majority society will distance themselves from this actor, because of the extreme
views it expresses. Mainstream political actors will not want to be viewed in the same camp as a party
that is explicitly anti-Muslim and expresses ‘Islamophobic’ views. This leads to a broader range and
differentiationof political reasons for opposinggroup rights, includingmoremoderate ones, andadiffer-
ent set of available cues for the public to understand the issue.
In Britain, it seems that in the absence of a mobilised anti-Islamic political actor, a groundswell of
resentment has built up among the British majority over the significant extension of Muslim group
rights. Without the trigger of an anti-Islamic party on the political landscape, there is a lot of low
level undifferentiated resentment expressed against Islam that is manifest in everyday life, but largely
ignored by political elites and unrepresented in public debates. In this context, perceptions that elites
are not responding to majority opinions, for example, in claims that the government’s ‘political cor-
rectness’ leads to policies that privilege Muslims over majority interests, may also lead to Islam
becoming a focus for broader anti-elite sentiments. At present these remarks remain speculative.
To go further, we would need more data and systematic research on the relationship between public
debates and opinions over Muslims group rights.
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Notes
1. Empirical research on migrants’ group rights demands reported in the news in the 1990s, showed a strong pro-
pensity for group claims by Muslims, compared to other ethnic and religious groups in Britain, France and the
Netherlands. Groups with a Muslim identity made between 47% and 61% of group demands, and in Britain where
there are three times as many Muslims compared to Hindus, Muslims made 61% of group demands compared to
only 2% by Hindus (Statham et al. 2005, 429–430; 440–1). There is also evidence that group rights matter more to
Muslims than other minorities. For example, a British survey in 2010 showed that (predominantly Muslim) Pakis-
tani and Bangladeshi groups significantly supported group rights issues (separate religious instruction and allow-
ing traditional dress in schools) more than other minorities, and that within Indian and Black African groups,
Muslims supported group rights significantly more than non-Muslims (Heath et al. 2013, 71).
2. This perspective is commonplace in communications and public sphere research, see for example, Bennett and
Entman (2001) and Koopmans and Statham (2010).
3. On this perspective, see for example, Bennett and Entman (2001), Hilgartner and Bosk (1988) among many
others, and on minorities and media, see Bleich et al. (2015).
4. Selected newspapers: De Volkskrant, Trouw, NRC Handelsblad, De Telegraaf, and Het Parool in the Netherlands;
Neue Zürcher Zeitung, Blick, Tagesanzeiger, Le Matin, and Le Temps in Switzerland; Bild, Süddeutsche Zeitung,
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung, Welt, and Tagesspiegel in Germany; Daily Mail, Daily Mirror, The Guardian,
The Sun, and The Times in Britain; Het Laatste Nieuws, Le Soir, Gazet Van Antwerpen, La Dernière Heure,
and De Standaard in Belgium.
5. For more detail see: http://www.eurislam.eu/page=site.workpackage/id=2.
6. Note government actors, such as Ministers, are coded as ‘state and judiciary’ although they are also representatives
of political parties. But actors from governing parties, such as MPs, are coded ‘legislative and political parties’, if
speaking on behalf of the party organization.
7. Some Muslim actors in Germany oppose Muslim group rights (resulting in a mean position score of +0.54),
because of a secular commitment to equality over special religious needs.
8. The author acknowledges the assistance of Rose Coates in this analysis.
9. EURISLAM—Finding a Place for Islam in Europe: Cultural Interactions between Muslim Immigrants and Receiv-
ing Societies (2008–2012), funded by the European Commission seventh framework programme theme SSH-
2007–3.3.1 Grant agreement no.: 215863.
10. For further information on sampling frame, representativeness checks and response rates, see report at http://
www.eurislam.eu/page=site.workpackage/id=4 and questionnaire at http://www.eurislam.eu/page=site.
workpackage/id=3.
11. The four Muslim groups’ opinions were highly significantly different from their national majority in 45 out of a
possible 48 cases (3 questions × 4 ‘Muslim’ groups × 4 countries).
12. The authors of the most comprehensive up-to-date study on minority political integration in Britain find that
Muslims support group rights significantly more than non-Muslim minorities (Heath et al. 2013, 71). However,
they express regret that their survey data does not allow them to gauge the degree to which this Muslim support
presses in an opposite direction to the majority population. This again underlines the interpretive gains to be
made by also including people from the majority population in the sample.
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